Abstract: China's economy ended 2018 with 6.6% growth. Its recent supply-side structural reforms to manage the transition of its economy from an investment-driven to an innovation-driven growth model may have some achievements, but the China-US trade war and high debt level of corporations and local governments are among the major uncertainties for the Chinese economy. Since mid-2018, the government has modified its policy priorities, from a strong emphasis on structural reforms to measures that safeguard growth.
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The surveyed unemployment rate in urban areas, which also takes into account the unemployment rate of migrant workers, also showed that unemployment had stabilised at about five per cent in 2018 (Figure 2 ), a similar level as that in 2017.
Figure 2 China's Urban Surveyed unemployment rate in 2017 and 2018 (%)
Source: CEIC.
Other measures also indicate the relative stability of the economy, though growth continues to decelerate. Fiscal revenue amounted to RMB18.3 trillion in 2018, up by 6.2% from 2017.
Year-to-year Consumer Price Index and Producer Price Index were up by a modest 2.1% and 3.5% in 2018, respectively.
From the demand side, growth of total retail sales of consumer goods and fixed capital formation reached a respective 9.0% and 5.9% in 2018, compared to those of 2017. Final consumption and gross fixed capital formation contributed 76.2% and 32.4% respectively to GDP growth in 2018. Net exports in 2018 amounted to US$351.8 billion, down from $419.6 billion in 2017, a drag to overall growth.
GDP growth rate in 2019 is likely to be about 6.2%, according to predictions by IMF, OECD and the World Bank. At that rate, China is still on course to fulfil its target of becoming a moderately well-off xiaokang society according to President Xi Jinping's report at the 19th
Party Congress in October 2017. Growth deceleration in recent years is in part the outcome of structural reforms to modify the country's growth mode, from one that is driven by investment to a more efficient growth model that is also innovation-based. These structural reforms include cutting over-capacity and reducing overproduction as well as vigorous debt deleveraging. In mid-2018, the government modified its policy priorities, from a strong emphasis on structural reforms to measures that safeguard growth. Expansionary fiscal policy has been implemented to promote investment. Employment policies have been initiated to stabilise the labour market, along with a number of government initiatives to support private sector financing from the equity and bond market.
The government has also taken steps to improve the country's business environment. Some major sectors such as automobile and financial service sectors are to be deregulated further for foreign investors. The competition policy, which ensures a level playing field in the Chinese economy, has been highlighted by the Chinese government as "foundations" of China's economic policies.
Policy Changes after the "New Normal"
While growth stabilisation is important in the short run, the major issue for the Chinese economy in the long run is whether China can escape the "middle-income trap". Many economies fail to catch up with the leading country after reaching middle-income level.
Before the Chinese economy entered the "new normal", labour migration from rural to urban areas as well as high investment rate were driving forces behind economic growth.
This growth model brought forth two major macroeconomic imbalances: excess domestic savings (i.e. imbalance between high-investment and low-consumption) and external payment surpluses (i.e. the difference between domestic productive capacity and domestic expenditure). One important reason for these macroeconomic imbalances is decentralised governance in China. Local officials were incentivised to promote economic growth and coverage of local social programmes is shallow, leading to high household savings and low consumption.
The high-investment, high-saving and low-consumption model is unsustainable as productivity growth is slowing down, undermined by the misallocation of resources at the micro level with overcapacity in heavy industries, high leverage ratio, excess investment in the real estate sector and so on. A fiscal stimulus package could make the imbalances and misallocation in the Chinese economy even more serious. For example, the stimulus package in 2008 had diverted a lot of resources to the real estate sector and drove up land prices.
Policymakers in China in recent years have shown their preference for structural reforms than for stimulus packages to avoid the "middle-income trap". Premier Li Keqiang stated in the 2016 National People's Congress that structural reforms rather than stimulus package will be adopted for the next step of reform. Many structural reforms are designed at "the top level". Compared to the decentralised economic and social governance model, reforms with "top-level design" are expected to have better coordination with other reforms.
Policymakers can also set appropriate timing across reform initiatives.
Since December 2015, the Chinese government has initiated "Supply-Side Structural Externally, the United States has complained of its high trade deficit with China, China's practice of subsidising firms to achieve the targets set in the "Made in China 2025" and the infringement of the intellectual property right (i.e. in US section 301 investigation).
Initiative to deregulate the entry of the market was announced by President Xi Jinping at the Boao Forum for Asia in April 2018. Foreign investors can expect further opening up of industries including financial services, automobile industry and so on.
Although policies to stabilise growth can be helpful to address the risks of the high debt ratio as the state can coordinate creditors including state banks and debtors such as enterprises/local government to restructure debt, the China-US trade war can have a persistent effect on structural reforms of the competition policy and industrial policy.
The Imperative of Restructuring and Reform
Before 2014, the growth model of the Chinese economy was largely factor-driven. First is labour reallocation from sectors with lower productivity (rural areas) to sectors with higher productivity (urban areas). Second is high investment as a major factor for high high investment and low consumption). For instance, household final consumption as a share of GDP was about 38% in China in 2014, which was much lower than that of developed countries as well as some countries with similar development level such as India and Russia (Table 1) . External payment surpluses (i.e. the difference between domestic productive capacity and Recent studies show that local officials in China are more likely to be promoted if they have achieved better economic performance, such as higher GDP or fiscal revenue growth. Local officials hence have incentives to allocate fiscal resources to infrastructure rather than public service provision to residents.
At the household level, as the benefit level of pension, health insurance and other social programmes is shallow and social protection limited, household saving rate tends to be very high to prepare for possible adverse shocks; correspondingly, the share of consumption in total expenditure has been low. The high-investment, high-saving and low-consumption model is not sustainable. The number of rural workers has started to decline since 2012.
The scale of reallocation of labour force from rural to urban areas is likely to decrease.
More importantly, aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) has registered lower growth in recent years in China, which indicates resource misallocation at the micro level. TFP in China could be increased by as much as 25% if misallocation within sectors could be lowered to the levels as observed in the USA. In a recent study, TFP growth rate in China was even estimated to be negative between 2007 and 2012. Many of these misallocations are associated with overcapacity in heavy industries, overinvestment in the real estate sector and high leverage ratio for local governments and corporations, in particular SOEs. High leverage ratio for SOEs is related to the resource allocation pattern between SOEs and privately owned enterprises, with formal financial institutions giving priority to SOEs. The debt ratios (liability-asset ratio) for the centrally controlled and local SOEs are much higher than that for private enterprises ( Figure 5 ).
Figure 5 Liability-Asset Ratio in SOEs and Private Enterprises (%)
Source CEIC.
The high leverage ratio of local government is related to local infrastructure building and real estate development. Local governments set up Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs), an indirect channel for local governments to borrow from commercial banks or other avenues, to finance infrastructure building as well as commercial real estate projects.
Total debt incurred by these LGFVs was estimated to be around RMB45 trillion by the end of 2015, much higher than the official local government debt. Centrally controlled SOEs Local SOEs Private Enterprises support of the local government. Table 2 shows the significant increase in inventory volume particularly in lower tier cities in recent years. Overcapacity, another form of resource misallocation, is a byproduct of local industrial policy. Firms are likely to be small in size as the market is local and fragmented. Many local governments are incentivised to exercise local market protection to generate more tax revenue and GDP growth. In many cases, it is the local governments that create entry barriers which will segmentalise the market. For some industries with economies of scale, it is not efficient to have many small firms in the market. For example, in a government plan for the steel industry to improve industry efficiency, the policy target of the market share of the 10 largest companies in the industry was 50% in 2010 and 70% in 2020.
However, in 2015, the actual share was only 34.29%, much lower than the target set for the industry.
Deepening Reforms: Rebalancing and Reallocating
To avoid the "middle-income trap", economic policies to facilitate the transition to "high quality" growth which requires more efficient use of resources and an innovation-driven economy are necessary. However, a fiscal stimulus package could worsen the imbalances and misallocation in the Chinese economy. local governments have signed "target responsibility documents" to reduce capacity in selective industries such as the steel and coal industry.
To cut excess stocks in the real estate sector, local governments encourage migrant workers in cities to buy apartments. The monetisation in shanty towns rebuilding is also another important policy initiative. Residents in shanty towns were provided funds (i.e. monetisation) to buy apartments in the market when the government plans to rebuild shanty towns. Monetisation accounted for over 53% of shanty town rebuilding in China in 2017.
The government is expected to use the debt-for-equity swap in some cases and close zombie companies to lower the leverage ratio of SOEs. Local municipal bond has been issued to reduce the leverage ratio for local governments. In 2015, the Ministry of Finance announced the issuance of low-yield local municipal bonds to pay for local government/LGFVs' debts maturing in the short term. To reduce the leverage further, the State Council released No.
document in April 2017, forbidding local governments from endorsing the repayment of
LGFVs' loans.
In the first meeting of Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission in April 2018, "structural deleveraging" was highlighted to reduce the leverage ratios in major sectors for SOEs and local governments. In April 2018, to undermine shadow banking activities, PBOC announced overarching guidelines aimed at tightening supervision of the country's $15 trillion asset management products issued by banks, trust firms, insurance asset management companies, securities firms, funds and other entities.
There are also efforts to cut costs for firms with the reduction of social security contribution rate for employers (e.g. employers' contribution rate to pension and unemployment rate have been reduced since 2016) as well as tax cut (e.g. tax cut under the replacement of business tax with VAT reform). The government is considering more efficient use of energy and infrastructure upgrading to strengthen weak links.
Large scale poverty alleviation programmes have been implemented which are also considered very useful for promoting domestic consumption. Consumption per capita for poor households in China is estimated to increase significantly after they have been lifted out of poverty (i.e. $1.25 per capita in 2005 price per day).
Achievements and Problems of Structural Reforms
The bright spot in the Chinese economy in recent years is the progress made in structural reforms. Consumption has since 2015 accounted for more than 50% of economic growth, higher than investment (Figure 6 ). In 2018, consumption expenditure contributed to 76.2% of economic growth.
The growth rate of the leverage ratio (i.e. Debt-GDP ratio) has also been significantly reduced since 2017 (Figure 7) . Between 2012 and 2016, the leverage ratio had registered annual double-digit growth. The growth rate has since 2017 slowed down. Figure 8 shows the decrease in the liability-asset ratio in medium and large state holding enterprises since 2015.
Figure 6 Source of China's Economic Growth 2008-2018
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks and National Bureau of Statistics. Shadow banking activities also showed marked decline. According to the rating agency However, the implementation of structural reforms is not without its setbacks. Investment growth has decelerated and privately owned enterprises are more likely to be in a disadvantageous position for credit access, retaining production capacity and issuing bonds.
To a large extent, SSSR relies on government intervention rather than the market. Further, while structural reforms were designed at "the top level", it was implemented by the local government.
In this context, the incentive structure of local government is critical to implementing structural reforms. The weightage given to GDP growth rate in the evaluation of local officials' performance has been lowered and other indicators such as local government debt, environment protection and other policy targets have been included. With this new incentive structure, it is not surprising that there was a dive in the growth rate for infrastructure investment from local government/LGFVs. Fixed asset investment growth rate decreased from 9.8% in 2015 to 7.0% in 2017, and even further to 5.3% for the first eight months of 2018.
Under policies of SSSR, local governments have the incentive to reduce the leverage ratio of local enterprises to fulfil policy targets. To meet the target for air/water quality, some local officials closed down all factories regardless of whether the factories meet environmental standards before the inspection teams arrive to monitor pollution levels.
Small and privately owned enterprises are hence at a disadvantage.
Economic Risks and Uncertainties in 2018
The biggest blow to the Chinese economy in 2018 was undeniably the China-US trade war.
In April Besides economic shocks related to the trade war, the high debt level, particularly for privately owned companies, is still a serious concern. Privately owned companies currently account for 50% of tax revenue, 60% of GDP, 80% of urban employment and 90% of incremental jobs in the Chinese economy. In 2015, the private sector was estimated to account for 78% of investment in the manufacturing sector in China. Studies, vol. 82, Issue 3, 2015 , pp. 1154 -1193 Banks do not have strong incentive to grant loans to privately owned companies especially when the leverage ratio is still high in the Chinese economy. Figure 11 shows that statecontrolled enterprises enjoyed an even bigger share of bank loans for all groups of enterprises by size since 2014. The strengthened regulation of the shadow banking sector has further cut off private sector's access to credit. To stabilise growth, new expansionary fiscal policies had been introduced. Local governments can borrow more, as a significant lift to the upper limit of local government bond issuance is expected in 2019. Tax cut, which amounted to RMB1.3 trillion in 2018, is another important policy direction. Tax rate for value added tax has been reduced by one per cent since 1 May 2018 (from 17% to 16% for manufacturing and from 11% to 10% for transportation and construction sectors).
From October 2018, the threshold for personal income tax exemption was raised from RMB3,500 to RMB5,000 a month. Additional deductions from taxable income will be implemented from January 2019. Further tax cuts for small and micro-sized companies by RMB200 billion were announced in January 2019. Tax deduction policies imply lower tax revenue growth rate; in October and November 2018, tax revenue growth rate was negative (Figure 12 ). Fiscal deficit-to-GDP ratio target for 2019 is expected be further raised to three per cent. To stabilise the labour market, the State Council issued a policy in December 2018 to give employers a 50% rebate of employer's contribution to the unemployment insurance if a firm does not lay off its employees. To address the difficulties faced by the private sector, in October 2018, PBOC announced "three arrows", namely, increasing lending, supporting bond issuance and promoting equity financing for privately owned enterprises. More credit, more bonds will be issued to ease the financial difficulties of privately owned enterprises.
PBOC will also have supportive policies for public listed companies which plan to pledge their shares as collateral for loans. Many local governments have set up funds to support the financing of the private sector since October 2018. For example, Shenzhen municipal government set up funds of over RMB17 billion in November 2018 to support private enterprises.
To address the concern of the United States in the China-US trade war, China has increased its import from the United States, leading to a significant dip in current account balance as a share of GDP in recent years ( Figure 13 ). property right will also be enhanced.
For the year 2019, despite the risk of a high leverage ratio, the possibility of a debt crisis is low as the state can coordinate creditors including state banks and debtors such as enterprises/local government to restructure debt. One interesting case is the restructuring of Chongqing Iron and Steel which had a debt of over RMB41 billion and a liability asset ratio of over 114% in mid-2017. However, the restructuring of the firm took about only half a year under the coordination of the Chongqing municipal government using mostly a debt/equity swap. The liability asset ratio of the firm was reduced to 30% in 2018. In October 2018, OECD announced and promoted the principle of "Competitive Neutrality", which will be applied as part of the competition policy in China. Foreign and privately owned enterprises are expected to enjoy the same terms as the SOEs.
